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Empirical evidences show that technology licensing contracts differ significantly and may
consist of only up-front fixed-fee, only output royalty or the combinations of fixed-fee and
output royalty. We explain these possibilities under international technology transfer. The
trade-off between the incentive for saving the transportation cost of exporting and the
incentive for reducing competition after licensing is responsible for the results. Our
explanation differs from the existing studies where imitation and product differentiation are
responsible for different licensing contracts.
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Technology licensing is an important phenomenon in many industries and has 
generated a fair amount of theoretical and empirical research.
1 However, the 
evidences show that licensing contracts differ significantly. According to Rostoker 
(1984), royalty alone was used for 39% of the time, fixed-fee alone for 13% of time, 
and royalty and fixed-fee for 46% of time, among the firms surveyed. 
  In an international Cournot duopoly, where the foreign firm is technologically 
efficient than the host-country firm, we show that the optimal licensing contract may 
consist of only up-front fixed-fee, only output royalty or the combinations of fixed-fee 
and output royalty. The trade-off between the incentive for saving the transportation 
cost of exporting and the incentive for reducing competition after licensing is 
responsible for the results. Our explanation differs from the existing studies where 
imitation (Rockett, 1990) and product differentiation (Mukherjee and 
Balasubramanian, 2001 and Faulí-Oller and Sandonis, 2002) are responsible for 
different licensing contracts if the licenser and the licensee compete in the product 
market.
2 Huge amount of evidences on international technology licensing (see, e.g., 
Root and Contractor, 1981 and Saggi, 2002) provide empirical relevance to our 
analysis.
3 
  In a closed economy, Poddar and Sinha (2005) show that different types of 
licensing contracts can be the equilibrium outcomes if the licenser is cost inefficient 
than the licensee. They show that only fixed-fee (only royalty) is optimal for high 
(low) cost differences between the firms, and the combination of royalty and fixed-fee 
is optimal for intermediate cost differences. In contrast, we consider licensing in an 
open economy and show our results under the usual assumption of a low cost licenser 
and a high cost licensee. Our results also differ from theirs. We show that, if the own 
cost of the licensee is sufficiently high, licensing with only fixed-fee (only royalty) is 
optimal if the transportation cost is sufficiently high (low), which implies lower 
(higher) effective cost differences between the firms, while the combination of fixed-
fee and output royalty is optimal for intermediate transportation costs. If the own cost 
of the licensee is not very high, the optimal licensing contracts consist of either 
royalty only or the combinations of fixed-fee and royalty.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model and derives the results. Section 3 concludes. 
 
2. The model and the results 
Let us consider a firm, firm F , who wants to export its product in a country, called 
host-country. We assume that the constant marginal cost of firm F  is c, which is 
normalized to 0 , for simplicity. Firm F  also needs to incur a per-unit transportation 
                                                 
1 See Rostoker (1984), Kamien (1992) and Saggi (2002) for surveys on technology licensing. 
2 There is another literature which compares profitability of the fixed-fee licensing contract and the 
royalty licensing contract (see, e.g. Wang, 1998, Filippini, 2005 and the references therein). However, 
unlike the present paper, this literature does not consider optimal combination of fixed-fee and royalty. 
If the licenser and the licensee do not compete in the product market, asymmetric information 
about the quality of the technology may be the reason for different types of licensing contracts (Gallini 
and Wright, 1990).  
3 Kabiraj and Marjit (2003) show the effects of strategic trade policy on the incentive for fixed-fee 
licensing and consumers. Mukherjee and Pennings (2006a and 2006b) consider licensing by a 
monopolist in presence of strategic trade policy. In contrast, we consider optimal licensing contracts in 
a duopoly without strategic government policy. cost,  t, for exporting its product to the host-country.
 4 There is a firm in the host-
country, firm H , who can produce a homogeneous product at the constant marginal 
cost of production  0 > h c . 
  We assume that 
2
a
ch < , which will ensure that the equilibrium output of firm 
H  will always be positive. We also assume that  h c t < , which implies that the 
licenser (firm F ) has lower cost than the licensee (firm H ).  
  We assume that the inverse market demand function is 
  q a P − =           ( 1 )  
where the notations have usual meanings. 
  We consider the following game. At stage 1, the firms decide on licensing. 
Under licensing, firm F  offers a take-it-or-leave-it licensing contract with up-front 
fixed-fee (L) and per-unit output royalty (r ), and firm H  accepts the contract if it is 
not worse off under licensing than no licensing.
5 At stage 2, the firms produce like 
Cournot duopolists, and the profits are realized. We solve the game through backward 
induction.
6 
  Standard calculation shows that under no licensing, which will give us the 
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  Let us now consider the game under licensing. If firm F  licenses its 
technology to firm H , firm F  maximize the following expression to determine the 
optimal licensing contract: 
 
     L
t r a r r t a
Max
L r +
+ − + + −
9
) 2 ( 3 ) 2 (
2






2 2 t c a
L
t r a h + −
≥ −
+ −





) 2 ( 3 ) 2 (
2 2
h c t a
L
t r a r r t a + −
≥ +
+ − + + −
    (4) 
   0 , ≥ L r  and  0 , ≥ h f q q ,       ( 5 )  
where  f q  and  h q  are the equilibrium outputs of firms F  and H  respectively, and (3) 
and (4) show the participation constraints of firms H  and F  respectively. Since, ex-
                                                 
4 Though tariff barriers have reduced in recent years, international transportation costs are still 
significant (Hummels, 1991 and Milner, 2005). 
5 We will consider non-negative fixed-fees and output royalties. Like the existing literature on 
licensing, this may be motivated by the anti-trust laws. 
6 It must be clear that it is optimal for firm F  to license its technology to firm H , and not to enter the 
host-country market, thus creating monopoly in the host-country. However, the commitment by firm 
F  for not entering the host-country may not be credible either due to lack of enforcement in the world 
economy or it may be easy for firm F  to enter the market with almost similar technologies, thus 
preventing monopoly in the host-country (see, e.g., Marjit, 1990, Wang, 1998, Kabiraj and Marjit, 2003 
and Mukherjee and Pennings, 2005, to name a few, for similar assumptions). The assumption of no-
commitment by the licenser for not entering the product market after licensing can also be found in 
Gallini and Winter (1985) and Katz and Shapiro(1985) for licensing in closed economies. We follow 
this strand of the literature and assume away credible commitment by firm F  for not entering the 
host-country market after licensing, thus creating competition after licensing. post licensing, firm H  has no incentive to use the licensed technology if  h c r > , the 
optimal value of r  does not exceed  h c . Therefore, the optimal royalty rate satisfies 
h c r ≤ ≤ 0.  
 Since,  firm  F  offers a take-it-or-leave-it licensing contract to firm H , the 
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Ignoring the constraint  h c r ≤ ≤ 0 , we find that the optimal royalty rate is 
2
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t ≥ , the optimal royalty rate is 0 . Hence, the optimal 
royalty rate satisfying the constraint  h c r ≤ ≤ 0 i s   } },
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Given the assumption  h c t < , the optimal royalty rate can be zero (i.e., 
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ch < , and therefore, the 
optimal royalty rate cannot be zero in this situation.
7  It should also be clear that firm 
F  would always license its technology to firm H .
8 
  The following proposition is immediate from the above discussion.    
 
 Proposition 1: Assume   h c t < . We find that firm F  always licenses its technology to 
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  Licensing has certain effects. First, it helps to increase cost efficiency in the 
industry by allowing both firms to produce with the relatively superior technology, 
                                                 
7 If we relax the assumption that  h c t < , the optimal royalty rate can be zero even if 
5
a
ch < .  
8 The following reason makes licensing always profitable. Given the option for a two-part tariff 
licensing contract, firm F  has always the option to charge a royalty rate  h c , which makes firm H  
indifferent under licensing and no licensing, and makes firm F  better off under licensing than under 
no licensing, thus making licensing always profitable. 
9 We will consider non-negative fixed fees and output royalties. though positive royalty rate helps to reduce the cost efficiency. Second, licensing 
helps to save the transportation cost by reducing the cost of firm H , and therefore, by 
shifting production from firm F  to firm H . Third, licensing exposes firm F  to more 
intense competition in the product market by reducing the cost of firm H , and the 
positive royalty rate helps to reduce the intensity of competition faced by firm F  
after licensing compared to no licensing. In the absence of transportation cost, i.e., for 




ch < , since it helps firm F  to raise its profit through royalty income 
and also to minimize its loss of profit due to the intense competition after licensing. 
This is in line with Rockett (1990), Mukherjee and Balasubramanian (2001) and 
Faulí-Oller and Sandonis (2003). Similar argument follows even for low 
transportation costs. 
  If the transportation cost is not very small, i.e., 
5
2 h c a
t
−
> , the incentive for 
saving the transportation cost is also very important, and induces firm F  to charge a 
lower royalty rate and to extract the benefit of higher cost efficiency in firm H  with a 
suitable up-front fixed-fee. Hence, in this situation, the optimal licensing contract is a 




t > , the incentive for saving the transportation cost dominates the 
incentive for reducing competition after licensing, and induces firm F  to license the 
technology against a positive up-front fixed-fee only.   
 
3. Conclusion 
We provide a new reason for the existence of different types of licensing contracts.  
We show that, in case of international technology licensing, the trade-off between the 
incentive for saving the transportation cost of exporting and the incentive for reducing 
competition after licensing generate licensing contracts with only output royalty, only 
up-front fixed-fee or the combinations of fixed-fee and output royalty.  
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